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Politicians typically do not know what policies are best for achieving their broad objectives, so rely on 
bureaucrats for advice. Bureaucrats are better informed, so can manipulate outcomes by proposing 
policies that suit their interests. We capture this conflict of interests using a model of political decision-
making that focuses on the interaction between politicians and the bureaucracies that advise them. In the 
basic model, a representative bureaucrat, knowing the characteristics of a given project, recommends to a 
representative politician whether to adopt it. If the politician chooses to adopt the project, its 
characteristics are revealed ex post. On the basis of the revealed outcome, the politician decides whether 
to discipline the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat anticipates imperfectly the chances of discipline when making 
an ex ante recommendation. When project characteristics are multi-dimensional, the politician can choose 
whether to seek advice from one bureaucrat or more than one. We compare outcomes in these centralized 
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This paper deals with a classical theme of the political economy literature: the conﬂict of
interest between bureaucrats and politicians, with bureaucrats able to use their superior in-
formation to manipulate political outcomes. Politicians responsible for enacting legislation
will typically not know which policies are best suited for achieving their broad objectives.
They will not be able to predict the consequences of alternative policies, and they will not
know their costs. To inform themselves, they rely on experts in the bureaucracy. However,
politicians face diﬀerent incentives than bureaucrats. They are ultimately responsible to
their electorates, and will be judged based on outcomes achieved from the policies chosen.
Bureaucrats, on the other hand, are employees of the government and are ultimately re-
sponsible to the politicians. They do not face the discipline of the political marketplace,
but are constrained more by the possibilities of dismissal or lack of promotion, or by the
sizes of their budgets. Because bureaucrats are better informed than politicians, they have
the potential to manipulate this to their advantage by proposing policies that suit their
own interests. Given this, politicians may ﬁnd it useful to decentralize the bureaucracy so
that policy advice comes from more than one source. That is the main focus of this paper.
Our approach is to construct a simple analytical framework of bureaucratic advice that
can be used to compare the eﬃcacy of centralized versus decentralized modes of governance.
We focus on the decisions that politicians make on the basis of advice from bureaucrats.
In our basic model, a representative bureaucrat, knowing the relevant characteristics of
a given project, recommends to a representative politician whether to adopt the project.
If the politician decides to adopt the project, its characteristics are revealed ex post and
the politician can choose to discipline the bureaucrat. The discipline will be based on the
extent to which the outcome deviates from the politician’s preferences. The bureaucrat,
in deciding on an ex ante recommendation, anticipates the possibility of dismissal, though
with some uncertainty about the politician’s preferences or tolerance for adverse outcomes.
Using this basic framework, we then extend the model to allow for the fact that there
may be more than one dimension to project or policy choice. Two particular cases are
considered. In the ﬁrst, the politician must choose among diﬀerent sizes of a given project,
rather than focusing on an indivisible project as in the basic model. In the other, more
1than one project can be undertaken. In each of these cases, bureaucratic advice is multi-
dimensional, thereby providing more scope for the bureaucracy to manipulate political
outcomes, reminiscent of the Romer and Rosenthal (1978) agenda-control model. This
allows us to compare two regimes, a centralized one in which a single bureaucrat provides
advice on all dimensions of project choice, and a decentralized one in which separate
bureaucrats advise on diﬀerent dimensions.
The model is developed at a level of generality that allows for various types of diﬀer-
ences between the bureaucrat’s preferences and those of the politician. Thus, they could
diﬀer over preferences for the size of the public sector or over the eﬃciency-equity trade-oﬀ.
Moreover, either the politician or the bureaucrat could be viewed as being more closely
aligned with the consensus views of the voters. Depending on the interpretation used,
there may be diﬀerent implications for the choice of institutional or constitutional rules
that should govern public sector decision-making, such as whether the senior bureaucracy
should be permanent employees or appointed by the politician currently in power. For
concreteness, we assume that bureaucrats have a stronger preference for projects being
undertaken than do politicians, perhaps because of Leviathan-like tendencies. Politicians,
of course, recognize this when weighing the advice they receive.
Our model of governance takes the form of an principal-agent problem in which bu-
reaucrats serve as agents to politicians. Such problems have been widely examined in
the literature, typically using the standard optimal contract framework as sumarized in
Laﬀont and Tirole (1994). With complete contracts, the politician can elicit at a cost
the information possessed by the bureaucrat. We rely instead on an incomplete contract
setting where the politician has limited ability to reward as well as to penalize the agent
because the bureaucrat’s performance is diﬃcult to assess and/or verify. Our paper is
related to Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Milgrom (1981), who discuss strategic informa-
tion transmission in general contexts. Li, Rosen and Suen (2001) examine the case where
committee members, each of whom has private information, fail to pool such information
since they have an incentive to manipulate information transmission in their favor. De-
watripont and Tirole (1999) address the possibility that competition among advocates of
speciﬁc interests can lead to better information production as a whole, even though each
2of them is motivated to defend a certain cause. An example is a court in which a defense
attorney defends a client, while the prosecutor is tough with the defendant. A related
recent paper by Prendergast (2003) considers the bureaucracy as a second-best institution
for dealing with the ineﬃciency of market transactions. Our model also considers the role
of informed parties in enhancing the information available to decision-makers, in our case
political decision-makers. We study how the structure of governance in the bureaucracy
can enhance the information available to uninformed politicians.
As mentioned, our approach is also related to the agenda-setter model of Romer and
Rosenthal (1978) where the bureaucrat has control over the size of a project being proposed
to replace the status quo. Various papers have extended this to an explicit asymmetric
information setting. Romer and Rosenthal (1979) explore the eﬀect of uncertainty about
voter preferences on the ability of the bureaucrat to set the agenda. Banks (1990) assumes
that the bureaucrat is better informed about the status quo than voters, and shows that the
true status quo state is never revealed to voters. Banks (1993) extends the analysis to two-
sided uncertainty, where voters do not know the status quo while the bureaucrat does not
know voters’ true preferences. The status quo is revealed in this case, but the bureaucrat’s
proposal is biased downward relative to when voters already know the status quo, implying
that an informational advantage lowers the bureaucrat’s ability to manipulate outcomes.
In these agenda-setter models, the bureaucrat oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the
principal, while in ours the bureaucrat’s agenda-setting power is advisory in nature. The
politician uses the advice of the bureaucrat to update his beliefs about the quality of
the project and can choose to accept or ignore the bureaucrat’s advice. For moderate
diﬀerences between the politician’s and the bureaucrat’s evaluation of the project, the
politician will rely on the bureaucrat’s message so the latter is eﬀectively an agenda-setter.
The politician may be able to moderate the inﬂuence of the bureaucracy by choosing
between a centralized and decentralized bureaucracy.
The paper by Li and Suen (2004) is similar in approach to ours. They study the
case for a principal employing experts who are better informed, but whose preferences
are biased. Their focus is on whether to hire one or more experts to decide whether to
undertake a single project. Unlike in our model where bureaucrats provide advice while
3the politician retains decision-making power, theirs is a model of delegation of authority.
They focus on the beneﬁt of delegating decision-making on a given project, while we focus
on the eﬀect of decentralizing bureaucratic advice when projects are multi-dimensional in
nature. Alesina and Tabellini (2003) are also concerned with the delegation of tasks from
politicians to bureaucrats. They examine from a positive standpoint which type of tasks
the politician would prefer to retain and which they would delegate to bureaucrats, and
relate this to an eﬃcient amount of delegation.
We present in Section 2 the basic model involving one representative politician, one
representative bureaucrat, and one project to be decided on. The next two sections allow
for the fact that projects are multi-dimensional, with the possibility that advice can be
sought from more than one bureaucrat with independent advisory responsibilities. We
investigate the advantages and disadvantages of decentralizing the bureaucracy in the
context of projects of variable size in Section 3 and multiple projects in Section 4. A ﬁnal
section considers some extensions.
2 The Basic Setting
We begin with a simple model involving a single political decision designed to illustrate
the mechanics of our approach. The focus is on the interaction between a representative
politician, denoted P, who must decide whether to undertake a project, and a represen-
tative bureaucrat, denoted B, who advises P and is better informed. The project under
consideration is independent of any other projects that might be undertaken so issues of
decentralized versus centralized governance do not arise in this section. The project yields
given beneﬁts to P and B, and varies along a single dimension, which we take to be its
cost. While the beneﬁts of the project to P and B are common knowledge, B is better
i n f o r m e dt h a nPa b o u ti t sc o s t s .
The relationship between P and B is hierarchical with B providing advice to P, rec-
ommending either that the project be undertaken or rejected. The recommendation is
based both on the beneﬁt of the project to B relative to its costs and on the expectation
of being disciplined, which depends on the net beneﬁt realized by P and some uncertainty
about P’s tolerance for bad outcomes. Discipline can be thought of as dismissal of B from
4his current job. P decides whether to accept B’s advice based on expectations about the
project’s costs and how they aﬀect B’s recommendation. These expectations are formed
knowing B’s evaluation of the project and the distribution of possible project costs, and in
equilibrium are correct. B’s advice will generally be biased with respect to P’s preferences,
with the direction of bias depending on the relative valuation of the project by P and B.
The only role of B is to advise P whether to undertake the project. Other administra-
tive roles are suppressed, as well as other modes of behavior, such as eﬀort, rent-seeking,
etc. This serves to focus our attention on the role of B as a well-informed policy advocate.
We need not be explicit about the source of the diﬀerence in relative values of the project
to P and B. Either one may be more benevolent than the other from a social welfare
point of view. Thus, B can be either a public servant in the normative sense or can have
Leviathan tendencies. Similarly, P’s values might be based on various combinations of
ideology, vote maximization, self-interest, or debts to special interests. For concreteness,
we shall evaluate outcomes from the perspective of P’s preferences in what follows.
To be more precise, B’s recommendation is given by a message m ∈{ 0,1},w h e r e
m = 1 means B recommends that the project be undertaken, while m =0m e a n sB
recommends rejection. The decision by P to accept or reject a project is denoted by
x ∈{ 0,1},w h e r ex = 1 if the project is undertaken and x = 0 if it is not. P’s choice of x
is inﬂuenced by B’s advice m, but P may accept or reject the project regardless of m.
The cost of the project under consideration is c. It is drawn from a distribution Φ(c)








B knows the cost of the project with certainty at the time the message m is sent, although
adding some uncertainty would not alter the essence of the argument as long as B is better
informed than P. On the other hand, when x is chosen, P knows only the distribution
Φ(c) from which the project is drawn, along with B’s recommendation. If the project is
undertaken (x = 1), the cost c becomes known to P and can be used to discipline B ex
post. If the project is not undertaken, no costs (or beneﬁts) are incurred, and P does not
5learn the project cost. In this case, B is not disciplined.1
An important assumption is that P cannot oﬀer B a contract based on the value of
c that is revealed ex post if the project is undertaken. This might be because c is non-
veriﬁable. It might include not only monetary expenses but also political costs. It could
also include any welfare costs due to policy distortions, external costs from environmental
externalities, or imputed costs of the redistributive eﬀects of the project. In that sense, the
contract between P and B is incomplete. As is well-known from the literature on complete
contracts (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1994), if the project cost c is veriﬁable ex post, and if the
payment to B can be made contingent on c, an incentive scheme can be designed so that
B’s interest is aligned with that of P. The inability to enforce complete contracts—which
seems to be a realistic assumption in the context of bureaucratic advice—is a key element
of our approach and allows B to manipulate outcomes in his favor.
The information structure is summarized by the following timeline of events:
time








to P if x =1
Bm a yb e
disciplined
Our focus is on the choice of m by B followed by the choice of x by P. We characterize
equilibrium outcomes by analyzing these choices in reverse order.
2.1 The Payoﬀ to the Politician
Let bP be the beneﬁt obtained by P if the project is undertaken. We assume that bP is
also known to B, although some uncertainty could be added without changing the nature
of the results. The ex post payoﬀ to P once c is revealed, denoted vP,i sg i v e nb y :
vP =( bP − c)x for x ∈{ 0,1}
Note that if x =0 ,vP = 0: no beneﬁts or costs are incurred if the project is not undertaken.
1 The reader might wonder why B’s message is simply a recommendation whether to undertake
the project rather than the cost itself. The reason is that in our context, a message space
consisting of project cost would be no more informative to P than a recommendation about
whether to proceed since the choice of the politician is a binary one. This will continue to be
the case in the following sections as well. This might be contrasted with Crawford and Sobel
(1982) whose message space is the cost of the project. In their case, actions of the principal
are continuous.
6The ex ante expected payoﬀ to P at the time x is chosen, given m,i s :
E[vP|m]=( bP − E[c|m])x for x ∈{ 0,1}
Denote P’s choice of x given B’s message m by xm. The following lemma is apparent:
Lemma 1: xm =1iﬀ bP  E[c|m].
The expected value of the project cost c given B’s message m, E[c|m], depends on
P’s beliefs about B’s choice of m. P knows that B will recommend undertaking the policy
only if project costs c are low enough. Let ˆ c be P’s belief about the cutoﬀ level of c below
which B will advocate undertaking the project: P believes that m =1i fc  ˆ c,a n dm =0
otherwise. These beliefs will be correct in equilibrium, as discussed below. Given the
uniform distribution Φ(c), P’s beliefs can be summarized as follows:
E[c|m =1 ]=






≡ b,E [c|m =0 ]=
  c
ˆ c dΦ(c)
1 − Φ(ˆ c)
=
ˆ c + c
2
≡ b (2)
where b>b . By Lemma 1, x1 =1i ﬀbP >b ,a n dx0 =1i ﬀbP > b.T h u s ,b and b are the
cutoﬀ levels for P’s choice of x, given B’s two possible recommendations m ∈{ 0,1}.
The following ﬁgure summarizes how P’s choice of x is aﬀected by the value of the
project bP, B’s message m, and P’s beliefs about the cutoﬀ level ˆ c as reﬂected in b and b.
bP
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
b b






It is clear that B can inﬂuence P’s choice, albeit imperfectly. B’s advice will always be
heeded when P’s evaluation of the project is in the range b>b P >b . However, for bP > b,
P will undertake the project regardless of B’s advice, and vice versa for bP <b .W h e n
beliefs are correct, B can perfectly anticipate P’s choice of x given the recommendation m.
2.2 The Payoﬀ to the Bureaucrat
B faces the possibility of being disciplined if the ex post payoﬀ to P, vP, is unsatisfactory.
Assume that P disciplines B if vP falls below some reservation level whose value is uncertain
7to B. Let B’s perception of the reservation payoﬀ to P be v0−ε,w h e r eε is a random variable
distributed according to G(ε)w i t hG (ε) > 0. It may reﬂect B’s uncertainty about the
ideology or tolerance of the politician.2 Then, if the project is undertaken (x = 1), P will
dismiss B if vP = bP − c  v0 − ε,o rε  v0 − vP = v0 + c − bP. B’s perception of the
probability of dismissal, given G(ε), is:
Prob[dismissal|x =1 ]=P r o b [ ε  v0 + c − bP]=G(v0 + c − bP)
Throughout the paper, we assume that that G(ε) has the following properties:
i) G(v0 + c − bP)=0i fv0  bP − c
ii) G(v0 + c − bP) > 0a n dG (v0 + c − bP) > 0i fv0 >b P − c
Thus, B will not be dismissed if the project payoﬀ is at least as great as P’s reservation
payoﬀ, but otherwise there is a positive and increasing probability of dismissal. We also
assume that if the project is not undertaken, P does not learn c and B is not dismissed.
In the following two sections, an important property will be the sign of G  (ε), that is,
whether the probability of dismissal rises more or less rapidly with ε. Whether it is
positive or negative will aﬀect the consequences of decentralizing the bureaucracy.
Assume that if the project goes ahead, its payoﬀ to B is bB − c, which will generally
diﬀer from P’s payoﬀ since the beneﬁts bP and bB may diﬀer. Let the cost of dismissal
to B be normalized to unity. Then the expected payoﬀ to B, given P’s choice of x,i s
E[vB]=( bB − c − G(v0 + c − bP))x,s ovB = 0 if the project does not go ahead (x =0 ) .
B can inﬂuence E[vB] only by his choice of message m, which aﬀects P’s decision x.I n
fact, B’s inﬂuence over P’s choice of x is somewhat restricted given the binary nature of
both m and x.L e tΔx ≡ x1 − x0. Then, as indicated above, Δx =1f o rb <b P < b,a n d
zero otherwise. B’s message will have a decisive impact on the project outcome only if P’s
evaluation bP is in this middle range.
2 An alternative, perhaps more realistic, assumption would be that P can only observe the
cost c ex post with some error. (Indeed, this will contribute to incomplete contracting.)
The qualitative eﬀects of this would be the same as assuming the uncertainty lies with
P’s tolerance for unfavorable outcomes, and we adopt the latter for simplicity. Yet another
alternative would be to introduce some ex ante uncertainty about project cost c. For example,
c could include random factor so that ˜ c = c + ε with E[ε] = 0, and the bureaucrat can only
observe c which is ex ante unknown to the politician. The chance of replacing the bureaucrat
would then be related to ε. This would complicate the analysis even further without yielding
any additional insights.
8In choosing m, B compares his expected payoﬀs for m =0a n dm =1 ,g i v e nc:
E[vB|m =1 ]− E[vB|m =0 ]=
 
bB − c − G(v0 + c − bP)
0
if
b <b P < b
bP <b ,b P > b
(3)
Clearly, B sends a message of m =1i fa n do n l yi fbB  c + G(v0 + c − bP). Since G  > 0,
the righthand side is increasing in c, so there will be a value of c = cB such that:
bB = cB + G(v0 + cB − bP)( 4 )
The implication is that for b <b P < b, B prefers m = 1 as long as c  cB,a n dm =0
otherwise. When bP <bor bP > b, B is indiﬀerent between m =0a n dm =1s i n c e
the message does not inﬂuence P’s decision (Δx = 0). Without loss of generality, we can
assume that in these latter cases, B follows the same rule as when b <b P < b,s oB ’ s
decision can be characterized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2: m =1iﬀ c  cB,w h e r ecB satisﬁes (4).
2.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, P’s belief ˆ c must be consistent with B’s cutoﬀ cost cB,o r ,u s i n g( 4 ) :
bB =ˆ c + G(v0 +ˆ c − bP)( 5 )
This yields ˆ c(bB,v 0,b P), where ∂ˆ c/∂bB > 0a n d0<∂ ˆ c/∂bP = −∂ˆ c/∂v0 < 1. Since B
correctly anticipates P’s beliefs, he knows xm precisely. From this, we can see that P’s
policy preference bP inﬂuences ˆ c, which in turn inﬂuences his beliefs (b,b) by (2), and thus
both his decision by Lemma 1 and B’s decision by Lemma 2. Using (5) and (2), cutoﬀ
values for b and b satisfy the following:
bB =2 b + G(v0 + b),b B =( 2 b − c)+G(v0 + b − c)( 6 )
Thus, b equates bP with E[c|m =1 ]a n df o rbP >b ,w eh a v ebP >E [c|m =1 ] . T h e
analogous interpretation can be given to b so that for bP > b, bP >E [c | m =0 ] . G i v e n
these expressions determining b and b, equilibrium can be summarized in the following
proposition, where superscript e denotes equilibrium values:















1 =0 bP <b
xe
0 =0 ,x e
1 =1 i f bP ∈ [b,b]
xe
0 = xe
1 =1 bP > b
where ˆ c satisﬁes (5),and b and b satisfy (6).
Clearly, the equilibrium outcome for any given project depends not only on its cost c,
but also on the beneﬁts bP and bB obtained by P and B respectively. To illustrate possible
equilibria, we proceed by considering how various relative evaluations of a project by B
aﬀect outcomes from P’s point of view. To focus on interesting outcomes, it is useful to
restrict parameters values such that b>b> 0a n dc>b .I fb > c, no projects would ever
be undertaken, while if b<0, all projects would be. Using (6) and the fact that its right-
hand sides increase in b and b, the range of values of bB is G(v0 + c)+2 c>b B >G (v0).
We can then classify possible values of bB into two ranges, given P’s reservation payoﬀ v0:
High values: G(v0)+c<b B <G (v0 + c)+2 c ⇐⇒ 0  b < c<b
Low values: G(v0)  bB  G(v0)+c ⇐⇒ 0  b < b  c
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) indicate equilibrium outcomes for these two ranges of values of
bB. The shaded areas in each ﬁgure indicate projects that will be undertaken. The lines
labeled ˆ c depict the solutions of (5) for ˆ c in terms of bP for each of the two cases. For all
points to the left of these lines, B recommends undertaking the project (m =1 ) ,a n dv i c e
versa. These recommendations are decisive unless bP falls outside the range b <b P < b.
These ﬁgures can be used to compare the full-information outcomes with those in which
only B is fully informed. All projects to the left of the diagonal line (c = bP)w o u l db e
chosen by P under full information. In each case, some projects should be undertaken but
are not—Type I errors—and some projects should not be undertaken but are—Type II
errors. Areas of Type I and Type II errors are labeled I and II.
Figure 1(a) depicts the case in which B attaches a relatively high value to the project.
Here, only relatively high-cost projects are not recommended. For bP >b , all projects
to the left of the ˆ c line are recommended by B and undertaken by P. For bP <b ,s o m e
10projects are not undertaken despite being recommended by B. Type I errors are shown
as oab and Type II errors are bcde. The range of both Type I and Type II errors will
increase the greater is the deviation between bB and G(v0)+c.
The low-value case is depicted in Figure 1(b). In this case, the line ˆ c representing
B’s indiﬀerence locus intersects the diagonal line above b.3 Outside the range b <b P < b,
there are some projects undertaken by P that are not recommended, and some projects
not undertaken that are recommended. B’s message is biased downward for high values of
c and upward for low values of c. There are alternating areas of Type I errors (oab, fde)
and Type II errors (bcf, egh). Their sizes depend on the slope of the ˆ c curve. From (5), we
infer that ∂bP/∂ˆ c =( 1+G )/G  > 1. Increases in P’s evaluation bP will tend to increase
Type I errors and reduce Type II errors in the middle ranges of bP with b <b P < b.4
This completes our description of the basic model of bureaucratic advice. In what fol-
lows, we extend the basic model to cases in which the policy decisions are multi-dimensional
so that bureaucratic advice can be decentralized. Our focus is on how the governance struc-
ture in the bureaucracy can constrain the form of policies undertaken by the politician.This
allows us to investigate alternative governance arrangements in the bureaucracy, focusing
especially on the comparison between centralized versus decentralized advice. We consider
two main cases. The ﬁrst involves projects that can diﬀer in size as well as costs, so pol-
icymakers must decide not only whether to undertake a project, but also how large the
project should be. In the other, more than one project can be undertaken. In both cases,
there is the possibility of relying on a single bureaucrat to provide advice over both dimen-
sions of project choice, or decentralizing advice to two bureaucrats each of whom advises
on a particular dimension of the project. Decentralizing advice does not unambiguously
improve information in our context. Depending on the circumstances, it may cause advice
3 To see this, let b∗
P be at the intersection of the ˆ c locus with the diagonal. By (5), b∗
P =ˆ c
implies bB = G(v0)+b∗
P. Then, (6) implies that b∗
P >b ,a n db  c leads to b∗
P < b.
4 In Figure 1(b), Type I errors occur when bP <bwith prob[c<b P]=Φ(bP), which increases
in bP. Type I errors also occur in the range b>b P >b B − G(v0)w i t hp r o b [ bP >c ]=
Φ(bP) − Φ(ˆ c), which increases in bP. Type II errors occur when bP > b with prob[bP <c ]=
1 − Φ(bP), which decreases in bP. Type II errors occur where b <b P <b B − G(v0)w i t h
prob[bP <c ]=Φ(ˆ c) − Φ(bP), which decreases in bP.
11to be more expansionary or more conservative than centralization: that is, it may lead to
more Type II errors and less Type I errors, or the reverse. In these circumstances, the
choice between centralized and decentralized regimes depends upon the weights put on
these two types of errors.5
3 Choice of Project Size
Suppose now that projects can diﬀer in size as well as cost. It suﬃces to consider two
project sizes, small or large.6 It is useful to think of project size being determined se-
quentially, although this is only for analytical convenience. First, a decision is made about
whether to undertake a project of basic size. Then, if the basic project is accepted, a
decision is made whether to expand it. P can now choose among three mutually exclusive
outcomes, x ∈{ 0,1,2},w h e r ex = 0 means no project is undertaken, x =1m e a n st h e
basic project is undertaken, and x = 2 means the expanded project is undertaken.
Given that two sequential decisions are made by P, two separate recommendations
can be made by the bureaucracy. Thus, the message consists of two elements, m ≡
(m1,m 2), where mj = 1 means project size j is recommended and mj =0m e a n si ti s
not. The bureaucracy can recommend neither size project, only one project size, or both
project sizes. Since expansion to the large project size can only occur if the basic project
is undertaken, the message can be one of the following: m ∈{ (0,0),(1,0),(1,1)}.W e
distinguish between two governance regimes. In the centralized case, called Regime C, a
single bureaucrat B sends both m1 and m2. In the decentralized case, Regime D, there
are two bureaucrats, B1 and B2.B 1 advises on launching the project and sends m1, while
5 A comparison between two such regimes is also examined in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999)
and Li and Suen (2004), but they focus on a single project (or policy). We instead consider
the choice of regime in the context of multi-dimensional policy-making where decentralization
involves obtaining separate advice on each dimension of the policy.
6 A more natural case is that in which size is continuously variable, as in the original Romer
and Rosenthal (1978, 1979) analyses. Crawford and Sobel (1982) consider the general case of
principal-agent interaction when actions are continuous and an uninformed principal chooses
one action based on a message sent by an informed agent. They show that the informed
agent does not reveal the true state c but bundles realizations of c into a discrete number
of groups and sends a common message for all actions pooled within a group. Our model
captures the idea that a discrete number of messages will be sent, while at the same time
not complicating the analysis with a continuum of project sizes.
12B2 advises expanding the project and sends m2.
The structure of costs and information are a simple extension of the basis model. The
cost of the basic project and its expansion are identical and are each given by c,w h e r e
c is again drawn from the uniform distribution Φ(c)w i t hc ∈ [0,c]. If both the basic
project and its expansion are undertaken, the total cost is then 2c. The timing of events
is analogous to the basic case: 1) c is known to the bureaucracy; 2) m =( m1,m 2)i s
sent by the bureaucracy to P; 3) P chooses x = {0,1,2};4 )c is revealed to P if x =1
or x = 2 (but cost is not publicly veriﬁable); and, 5) bureaucrats may be disciplined. It
makes no diﬀerence whether m1 and m2 are sent simultaneously or sequentially since the
bureaucracy is fully informed so neither message depends on the other.
3.1 The Payoﬀs to the Politician and the Bureaucrats
The values to P of the two project sizes are b1
P and b2




reﬂecting an assumed concavity of beneﬁts. The ex post project payoﬀs to P are then:
v1
P = b1
P − c, v2
P = b2
P − 2c, ΔvP = v2
P − v1
P = ΔbP − c
all of which are decreasing in c.F o r ΔbP >c , the large project will be preferred to the
small project, and vice versa. Under full information, the following outcomes, denoted xf,





2i f ΔbP  c
1i fb1
P  c  ΔbP
0i f c>b 1
P
If c is known only to the bureaucracy when project decisions are made, P’s decision will





2i f ΔbP  E[c|m]
1i fb1
P  E[c|m]  ΔbP
0i f E[c|m] >b 1
P
The payoﬀs to the bureaucracy depend on whether Regime C or Regime D is in place.
Consider each in turn.
13Bureaucrat B’s Payoffs in Regime C
Let b1
B and b2
B be B’s beneﬁts from the basic project and its expansion, respectively. Then,
proceeding as in the basic model, B’s ex post payoﬀs are:
v1
B = b1
B − c − G(v1
0 + c − b1
P),v 2
B = b2
B − 2c − G(v2




0 are the reservation payoﬀs to P in the two project outcomes, and G(ε)h a s
the same properties as earlier. Then, deﬁning ΔvC
B and ΔbB in obvious ways and using
ΔbP = b2
P − b1




B = ΔbB − c −
 
G(v2
0 +2 c − b1
P − ΔbP) − G(v1




Of course, if neither project is pursued (x = 0), B’s payoﬀ is zero.
Bureaucrats B1 and B2’s Payoffs in Regime D
In this case, both bureaucrats B1 and B2 value the beneﬁts b1
B and b2
B and assess the costs
c and 2c if the small and large projects are undertaken. However, B1 can be disciplined
if either the basic project or its expansion are undertaken (since in either case the basic
project is undertaken), but B2 can only be disciplined if the expansion goes forward. Let
v1
B1 and v2
B1 be the payoﬀs to B1 from x =1a n dx = 2 respectively, with analogous





B − c − G(v
1






B − 2c − G(v
1





B − c, v2
B2 = b2
B − 2c − G(Δv0 + c − ΔbP) (10)
where Δv0 = v2
0 − v1
0.
Note that the expansion of the project does not change the risk to B1 of being dis-
ciplined. That depends only on the payoﬀ to P of the basic project, b1
P − c,a n dP ’ s
reservation payoﬀ, v1
0. Similarly, B2 is not penalized when x = 1. The probability of B2
being dismissed depends upon the payoﬀ to P from expansion, ΔbP − c, and the change
in the reservation payoﬀ, Δv0. Analogous to the case in Regime C, we deﬁne ΔvD
B as the




B2 = ΔbB − c − G(Δv0 + c − ΔbP) (11)
14To facilitate the analysis in this section, it is useful to make the following assumptions
(which will also be made in the next section):
Assumptions: i) ΔbB >Δ b P, and ii) v1
0  b1
P.
The ﬁrst assumption biases the outcome in favor of an expansion of the project relative
to the full-information case. The second implies that there is a positive chance of being
dismissed if the project is undertaken. These assumptions lead to the following lemma:7
Lemma 3: ΔvC
B  ΔvD
B iﬀ 0  G  (ε).
Thus, the bureaucracy will tend to be more ‘expansionary’ in Regime C than in Regime
D if the distribution function G(ε) is strictly concave and more ‘conservative’ if G(ε)i s
strictly convex. The relevance of the convexity or concavity of the distribution function
representing P’s tolerance plays a key role here and in the following section. There is
no natural assumption to make about the sign of G  (ε). That is, there is no natural
assumption to make about whether the probability of discipline raises more or less rapidly
with the deviation of P’s payoﬀ from his reservation level. That being the case, we shall
proceed by conditioning our results on whether or not G  (ε) is positive or negative, both
in this section and the following one.
Given these payoﬀs for P and the bureaucrats in the two regimes, we can now analyze
equilibrium outcomes. We begin with Regime C and then turn to Regime D.
3.2 Equilibrium Outcomes in Regime C
In this regime, B sends both messages m1 and m2. We can identify cutoﬀ values for c
that reﬂect B’s ranking of the various options. Let cC
1 and cC
2 be the values of c such that
v1
B =0a n dv2
B = 0 in (7). These will be uniquely determined since both expressions in
(7) are decreasing in c. Similarly, cC
12 is the value of c such that ΔvC
B = 0 in (8), which we
also assume is decreasing in c.8 Speciﬁcally, assuming that v1
B = v2
B > 0a tc = cC
12 and
7 The proof follows immediately by using (8), (11) and the fact that G( 0 )=0t og i v eΔvD
B −
ΔvC
B = G(Δv0 + c − ΔbP)+G(v1
0 + c − b1
P) − G(v1
0 + c − b1
P + Δv0 + c − ΔbP)  0a s
0  G  (ε), if c  ΔbP − Δv0. This condition holds in equilibrium.
8 Diﬀerentiating (8) yields ∂ΔvC
B/∂c = G (v1
0 + c − b1
P) − 2G (v1
0 + Δv0 +2 c − b1
P − ΔbP),
which will be negative if G  (ε) > 0. We assume that it remains negative if G  (ε) < 0.
15that cC
12 is in the interior, we have that cC
1 >c C
2 >c C
12 >Δ b P − Δv0.9 B’s payoﬀs from
the two projects, v1
B and v2
B,a sw e l la scC
1 ,c C
2 ,c C
12, and ΔbP are depicted in Figure 2.
In what follows, we restrict P’s preferences, b1
P and b2




















This restriction plays the same role as b  bP  b in the basic model, which is the range of
P’s preferences where B’s advice is decisive. Consider the following two obvious candidate





(1,1) if c  cC
12
(1,0) if c ∈ [cC
12,c C
1 ]






(1,1) if c  cC
2
(1,0) if c ∈ [cC
2 ,c C
1 ]
(0,0) if c>c C
1
(13)
If P rationally anticipates the strategy that B is following, then, on the basis of B’s message,























The following proposition, which is proven in the Appendix, indicates that strategies mI
and mII will be equilibrium strategies for diﬀerent ranges of P’s preferences.
Proposition 2: Assuming ΔbB >Δ b P:
(i) If b1
P  cC




















9 The last inequality follows from the assumption that ∂ΔvC
B/∂c < 0. At c = ΔbP − Δv0,
ΔvC
B = ΔbB − ΔbP + Δv0 − [G(v1
0 + ΔbP − Δv0 − b1
P) − G(v1
0 + ΔbP − Δv0 − b1
P)] =
ΔbB − ΔbP + Δv0 > 0.
16Two observations should be made about this proposition. First, B’s advice is always
decisive when equilibrium stategy mI is used. This is not the case for strategy mII.P
will never choose the small project despite the fact that B sometimes recommends it.





2 )/2], there will be multiple equilibria.
Figure 2 illustrates equilibrium outcomes in Regime C, denoted xC
I and xC
II,w h e nB
adopts strategies mI and mII. P’s preferences are shown as b1
P,w h e r e( cC
1 +cC
2 )/2  b1
P 
cC
2 and ΔbP <b 1
P. (In this case, both stategies can be equilibria.) The full-information
outcomes are shown as xf. If P knew the true costs, the large project would be chosen for
c<Δ b P, and the small project for c ∈ [ΔbP,b 1
P]. With strategy mI, the large project is
chosen for c<c C
12, the small project is chosen for c ∈ [cC
12,c C
1 ], and no project is chosen
for c>c C
1 , as advocated by B. From P’s point of view, equilibrium outcomes are biased
toward projects of excessive size, a form of Type II errors. That is, there will be some
large projects undertaken in equilibrium when only small projects would be chosen with
full information (for c ∈ [ΔbP,c C
12]); and there will be some small projects undertaken
that would not have been under full information (for c ∈ [b1
P,c C
1 ]). Under stategy mII,
outcomes xC
II = 2 extend all the way to c = cC
2 . There will be a larger range of costs for
which large projects will be undertaken when smaller ones would have been chosen under
full information (Type II errors). For c>c C
2 , neither project will be undertaken. Under
full information, some small projects in this range would have been undertaken, so there
are Type I errors.
To facilitate a comparison between Regimes C and D below, we focus below only on
equilibrium strategies mI given by (13). In this case, the bureaucracy’s advice is decisive,
which is also the case in Regime D as we shall now see.
3.3 Equilibrium Outcomes in Regime D
In this regime, there are two bureaucrats, B1 and B2, each of whom will have cutoﬀ levels
of c relevant for their own decisions. In the case of B1,t h ev a l u eo fc satisfying v1
B1 =0i n
(9) is the same as cC
1 ,s ocD
1 = cC
1 .F o rB 2,l e tcD
12 be the value of c that satisﬁes ΔvD
B =0
17in (11). The relationship between cD
12 and cC
12 is given by the following lemma:10
Lemma 4: cD
12  cC
12 iﬀ G  (ε)  0.
Thus, while the cutoﬀ cost level for the basic project is the same in the two regimes, that
for project expansion diﬀers. The implication will be, as we shall see, that the same advice
will be given in Regimes C and D with respect to the basic project, but it will diﬀer for
project expansion as long as G  (ε)  =0 .I fG  (ε) = 0, decentralization of the bureaucracy
will have no eﬀect.
The obvious strategies for the two bureaucrats in Regime C are then the following:
m1 =
 
















12/2i f m =( 1 ,1)
(cD
12 + cD
1 )/2i fm =( 1 ,0)
(cD
1 + c)/2i f m =( 0 ,0)




























































Then, equilibrium in Regime D is characterized by messages m1 and m2 sent by B1 and








Thus, the bureaucrats’ messages are decisive, as in Regime C
10 Proof: Since we assume that vC
B is decreasing in c, cC
12  ΔbP − Δv0 by (8). By Lemma 3,
ΔvC
B  ΔvD
B at c = cC
12 iﬀ 0  G  (ε). Since ΔvC
B decreases with c,L e m m a4f o l l o w s .
183.4 Comparison between Regime D and Regime C
For both regimes, we can summarize the quality of the outcomes from P’s perspective in
terms of Type I and II errors. With respect to the basic project, both Regimes yield the
same outcomes, and both Type I and Type II errors are possible depending on the size
of b1




1 ), too many projects will be undertaken. The
probability of Type II errors in the two regimes will be given by P C1




P). On the other hand, for b1
P >c D
1 = cD
1 , Type I errors will occur with probability
P C1
I = P D1
I = Φ(b1
P) − Φ(cD
1 ). These are independent of the concavity/convexity of the
distribution function G(ε).
Outcomes diﬀer, however, for the project expansion choice, and the direction of dif-
ferences depends upon the sign of G  (ε). Consider the two cases in turn.
Strictly Convex G(ε)
When G  (ε) > 0, cD
12 >c C
12 so decentralization tends to be more expansive. The permissible
values of ΔbP can be divided into three ranges. For low values (ΔbP <c C
12), Type II errors
occur for both regimes, but the probability is higher for Regime D:
ΔbP <c C
12 : P D2
II = Φ(cD
12) − Φ(ΔbP) >Φ (cC
12) − Φ(ΔbP)=P C2
II
For high values of ΔbP (ΔbP  cD
12), Type I errors occur in both regimes, but are higher
in Regime C:
ΔbP >c D
12 : P C2
I = Φ(ΔbP) − Φ(cC
12) >Φ (ΔbP) − Φ(cD
12)=P D2
I
In the intermediate range (cC
12 <Δ b P <c D
12), project expansion is chosen too often in
Regime D, but not often enough in Regime C:
cC
12 <Δ b P <c D
12 : P D2
II = Φ(cD
12) − Φ(ΔbP),P C2
I = Φ(ΔbP) − Φ(cC
12)
Thus, when the distribution function G() is strictly convex, Regime D tends to be relatively
expansionary and Regime C relatively conservative with respect to project size.
19Strictly Concave G(ε)
The opposite occurs when G  (ε) < 0, where cC
12 >c D
12. For low values of ΔbP (ΔbP <c D
12),
Type II errors occur in both regimes, but with higher frequency in Regime D:
ΔbP <c D
12 : P C2
II = Φ(cC
12) − Φ(ΔbP) >Φ (cD
12) − Φ(ΔbP)=P D2
II
When ΔbP >c C
12, Type I errors occur more frequently in Regime D:
ΔbP >c C
12 : P D2
I = Φ(ΔbP) − Φ(cD
12) >Φ (ΔbP) − Φ(cC
12)=P C2
I
In the intermediate range, Type II errors occur in Regime C, and Type I in Regime D:
cD







I = Φ(ΔbP) − Φ(c
D
12)
In this case, now Regime C is relatively more expansive and Regime C relatively more
conservative.
These results highlight the role played by the shape of the distribution function G(ε)
in determining the relative performance of the centralized and decentralized regimes. If
the probability of being disciplined rises more rapidly than deviations of project payoﬀs
from the politician’s reservation payoﬀ, a centralized regime—where a single bureaucrat
internalizes all dismissal costs—tends to be more conservative. To the extent that bureau-
crats tend to put more value on undertaking the project than politicians, the latter may
prefer to keep the bureaucracy centralized in these cases. The opposite occurs in the case
where G(ε) is strictly concave. These same considerations will play a similar role in the
next extension.
4 Multiple Projects
In the previous section, we considered diﬀerent sizes of a given project. In this section,
our focus is on diﬀerent projects of a given size. Suppose there are two projects under
consideration, denoted by the subscript j =1 ,2. Either one or both of the projects
can be carried out. The costs of the two projects, c1 and c2, are again assumed to be
distributed uniformly and independently over [0,c]. As in the previous section, there
can be two regimes. In Regime C, the single bureaucrat B observes (c1,c 2) and sends
20a message concerning both projects, m =( m1,m 2), where mj ∈{ 0,1}.I n R e g i m eD , a
separate bureaucrat Bj in charge of each project. Bj observes only cj, and sends a message
mj ∈{ 0,1} independently of the other bureaucrat. P chooses (x1,x 2), given the messages
(m1,m 2), and knowing bureaucratic preferences.
The two projects are symmetric to P and each yield the payoﬀ v
j
P =( bP − cj)i f
undertaken. Given the message m =( m1,m 2), P chooses xj =1i ﬀbP  E[cj|m]. It is
clear that mi aﬀects the expectation for cj,j = i, only in Regime C where one bureaucrat
sends the joint message. When there are two bureaucrats, each in charge of a project, no
information is learned about project j from the message sent by Bi.
B1 and B2 also evaluate the two projects symmetrically. They obtain a beneﬁt of bB
per project, and are faced with the prospects of discipline if their project is undertaken and
found to be excessively costly to P. In addition, the costs of a given project are shared by
the both bureaucrats. A share α ∈ [0,1] of the costs of a project is borne from the budget
of the bureaucrat in charge, while the other (1−α) is borne by the other bureaucrat. This
is a rough and ready way of reﬂecting an overall budget constraint facing all projects. Of
course, in Regime C, the single bureaucrat bears the full cost of both projects: spillovers
are internalized. We consider the two regimes in turn, beginning here with Regime D.
Regime D
We proceed as usual by considering the choice of the bureaucrats, then P’s choice, and
ﬁnally the deviation of outcomes in equilibrium from those preferred by P.
The Bureaucrats’ Messages
Each bureaucrat’s payoﬀ is aﬀected by whether the other’s project is undertaken, but is
uninformed about the latter’s cost or its prospects. Let ˜ ci and ˜ xi be the random values of





bB − αcj − (1 − α)˜ ci˜ xi − G(v0 + cj − bP)
−(1 − α)˜ ci˜ xi
if xj =1
if xj =0
Bj sends message mj =1i ﬀE[v
j
B|mj =1 ] E[v
j
B|mj =0 ] ,o rbB  αcj +G(v0+cj −bP).
Deﬁne ˆ cD such that Bj is just indiﬀerent between mj =1a n dmj =0 :
bB = αˆ cD + G(v0 +ˆ cD − bP) (14)
21Then, Bj will send mj =1i ﬀcj  ˆ cD. From (14), we obtain ∂ˆ cD/∂α < 0: as more of the
cost of a project is shifted to the other bureaucrat, the more aggressive is a bureaucrat in
advocating his own project.
The Politician’s Decision
Given the uniform distribution of cj, the P’s expectation of the costs given mj are
E[cj|mj =1 ]=ˆ cD/2a n dE[cj|mj =0 ]=( ˆ cD+c)/2. Assume that (ˆ cD+c)/2  bP  ˆ cD/2
so that P always takes the advice of B1 and B2. We can readily illustrate equilibrium out-
comes and errors in Figure 3. Project 1 is undertaken whenever c1  ˆ cD, that is, to the
left of the vertical line hm. Project 2 is undertaken whevever c2  ˆ cD, that is, below the
horizontal line qk. Thus, both projects are undertaken in the area oqsh.
Type II Errors in Regime D
If P knew costs cj ex ante, projects of type 1 to the left of gn and projects of type 2 below
fj would be undertaken. Therefore, given that (ˆ cD+c)/2  bP  ˆ cD/2, there will be only
Type II errors: some projects are undertaken that should not be. Type II errors for the
two types of projects are indicated by the following areas in Figure 3:
Project 1: P D
II =P r o b [ bP <c 1|x1 =1 ]=ghmn
Project 2: P D
II =P r o b [ bP <c 2|x2 =1 ]=fjkq
Note that these areas increase as α decreases.
Regime C
The Bureaucrat’s Message




(bB − cj)xj − G
  
(v0 + cj − bP)xj
 
(15)
B’s prospects of being disciplined depend on the sum of the payoﬀs to P from both projects,
where v0 is the reservation payoﬀ to each project. Using (15), the expected payoﬀs to B
when both or one project are undertaken are given by:
v12











B = bB − cj − G(v0 − bP + cj) j =1 ,2 (17)
22Let ˆ cC
1 =ˆ cC
2 be the critical value of cj such that v
j
B = 0, so by (17),
bB =ˆ cC
j + G(v0 − bP +ˆ cC
j ) j =1 ,2 (18)
where cj < ˆ cC
j implies v
j
B > 0, and vice versa. Similarly, deﬁne 2ˆ cC
12 as the critical average
value of c1 + c2 such that v12
B = 0. Then, by (16),
2bB =2 ˆ cC
12 + G
 
2(v0 − bP)+2 ˆ cC
12
 
so (c1 + c2)/2 < ˆ cC
12 implies v12
B > 0, and vice versa. For simplicity, we impose analogous
restrictions on preferences to those in the previous section:
Assumption: v0 >b P.
This implies that undertaking the second project increases the risk of being disciplined,
since
 
j(v0 + cj − bP) >v 0 + ci − bP. Note that the relative sizes of ˆ cC
j and ˆ cC
21 depend
on the sign of G  (ε) as follows:
ˆ cC
21  ˆ cC
j as G  (ε)  0
Once again, the concavity or convexity of G(ε) will be relevant. We consider these alter-
native cases in characterizing equilibrium outcomes below.
B will choose m1 = m2 =1i fv12
B > 0a n dv12
B >v
j
B (j =1 ,2); mj =1a n dmi =0
if v
j




B ;a n dm1 = m2 =0i fv12
B < 0a n dv
j
B < 0( j =1 ,2). To
characterize these cases, we can deﬁne the cutoﬀ values of costs which determine whether
B will prefer one versus two projects undertaken. Let cC




B for project j  = i. Equating (16) and (17), cC
i (cj) is determined by:
bB = cC
i + G(2(v0 − bP)+cj + cC
i ) − G(v0 − bP + cj) j =1 ,2 (19)
It is straightforward to show that the solution for cC
i (cj) will be in the range cC




B,w i t hv12
B  0. Moreover, the following properties of cC
i (cj) apply:11
cC





 0a s0  G  (ε)





j ). So, ˆ cC
j < ¯ cC
i (0) iﬀ¯ cC
i (0)+G(2(v0−bP)+¯ cC
i (0))−G(v0−bP) < ¯ cC
i (0)+G(v0−bP+¯ cC
i (0)).
Since G(0) = 0 and v0 >b P, this will be satisﬁed iﬀ G  (ε) < 0. Then, diﬀerentiating (19),
we obtain ∂¯ cC
i /∂cj > 0i ﬀG (2(v0 − bP)+cj +¯ cC
i ) <G  (v0 − bP + cj), or, iﬀ G  (ε) < 0.
23Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show B’s messages when G  (ε) < 0a n dG  (ε) > 0 (assuming






2 (0). Consider the two cases in turn.
Figure 4(a): Strictly Concave G(ε)






respectively. As well, the vertical line through gb is the locus v1
B = 0, while the horizontal
line through fd is the locus v2
b =0 . T h u s ,v1
B >v 12
B above ab, v2
B >v 12
B to the right of
ed, v12
B > 0t ot h es o u t h w e s to fbd, v1
B > 0l e f to fgb,a n dv2
B > 0b e l o wfd. Therefore,
B’s messages can be summarized as follows:
mC
1 = mC
2 = 1 within the area oabde
mC
1 = mC
2 = 0 northeast of bd
mC
1 =1 ,m C
2 =0a b o v eab
mC
1 =0 ,m C
2 =1r i g h to fde
Note that because the density of G(ε) is falling as its argument increases, there are projects
in the area bcd such that B would prefer that both be undertaken, even though the payoﬀ
from each of them if undertaken alone would be negative. In that sense, there are gains
from undertaking projects jointly in this case.
Figure 4(b): Strictly Convex G(ε)
In this case, these are disadvantages from undertaking projects jointly since the density of
G(ε) is increasing in its argument. Consequently, the range of projects for which B would





B, respectively. Along the line rs, v12
B = 0. As before,
the lines through gc and fc satisfy v1
B =0a n dv2




2 = 1 within the area oabe
mC
1 = mC
2 = 0 northeast of point c
mC
1 =1 ,m C
2 =0a b o v eabc
mC
1 =0 ,m C
2 =1r i g h to fcbe
Note that in the intermedate case where G  (ε)=0 ,t h ea r e aabe coincides with fcg.I n
24this case, for all points to the left of gc (v1
B = 0), project 1 would be undertaken, while
all those below fc (v2
B = 0), project 2 would be undertaken. Therefore, in the area fcg,
both would be undertaken.
The Politician’s Decision
P fully understands the ranges governing the messages sent by B, and must choose xC
accordingly. This will obviously depend on the value of the project to P. As usual, assume
that P’s preferences are such that B’s advice is always accepted. This will be the case if
the following conditions are satisﬁed:12
Assumption: E[ci|mi = mj =1 ] bP =ˆ cC
j  c/2
Given this assumption about P’s preferences, P’s decisions xj = {0,1},j=1 ,2 follow
directly from B’s messages outlined above with reference to Figures 4(a) and 4(b).
Type I and Type II Errors in Regime C
Given the assumption that bP =ˆ cC
j , we can characterize P’s preferred outcomes in Figures
4(a) and 4(b). Under full information, P would choose x1 = 1 for all points to the left of
the line through gc and x2 = 1 for all points below the line through fc. Using that as a
benchmark, we can see the errors involved for the two cases G  (ε) < 0a n dG  (ε) > 0.
As Figure 4(a) indicates, if G  (ε) < 0, there will be only Type II errors. Type II
errors for the two types of projects are enclosed by the following areas:
Project 1: P C
II =P r o b [ bP <c 1|x1 =1 ]=gbde
Project 2: P C
II =P r o b [ bP <c 2|x2 =1 ]=abdf
Note that these areas are smaller, the smaller is the value of |G  (ε)|.W h e nG  (ε)=0 ,
Type II errors disappear, and the preferences of B and P are aligned.
On the other hand, if G  (ε) > 0, there will be only Type I errors. These are given for
the two types of projects by the following areas in Figure 4(b):
Project 1: P C
I =P r o b [ bP >c 1|x1 =1 ]=bcge
12 The ﬁrst inequality implies that x1 = x2 =1i fm1 = m2 = 1. From the remainder of the
conditions, we have E[cj|mj =1 ,m i =0 ]< ˆ cC
j = bP  c/2 <E [ci|m1 = m2 =0 ]w h i c h
implies xj =1 ,x i =0i fmj =1 ,m i =0a n dx1 = x2 =0i fm1 = m2 = 0, as required. Note
that the assumption adopted in Regime D that E[cj|mj =1 ] bP  E[cj|mj =0 ]d o e sn o t
contradict the assumption used here.
25Project 2: P C
I =P r o b [ bP >c 2|x2 =0 ]=abcf
These areas also decrease as G  (ε) decreases.
Comparison between Regimes C and D
Figures 3 and 4 allow us to compare the relative magnitudes of Type I and Type II errors
in the two regimes under various circumstances. As a benchmark, continue to assume for
Regime C that bP =ˆ cC
j . As we have just seen, there will be Type II errors if G(ε) is strictly
concave, Type I errors if it is strictly convex, and no errors if it is linear. For Regime D,
assume that (ˆ cD +c)/2  bP  ˆ cD/2 so that P always takes the advice of the bureaucrats.
From (17) and (21), if α = 1 (so each bureaucrat bears the full cost of his own project),
ˆ cD =ˆ cC
j = bP. In this case, there will be no errors in Regime D.
If α<1, then ˆ cD > ˆ cC
j = bP since ∂ˆ cD/∂α < 0 by (18).13 As Figure 3 indicates,
there will be Type II errors in Regime D, and the errors will be higher the smaller is α,
so the greater are costs borne by the second bureaucrat. Suppose G  (ε) < 0, so there
will be Type II errors as shown in Figure 4(a). Imagine superimposing Figure 3 on Figure
4(a). If α is such that ˆ cD  cC
i (0), the area oqsh from Figure 3 will lie everywhere inside
oadbe from Figure 4(a), so Type II errors will be unambiguously higher in Regime C. As
α falls, the area oqsh increases. At the point where, ˆ cD  cC
i (ˆ cC
j ), Type II errors will be
unambiguously higher in Regime D. By the same token, if G  (ε) > 0, there will be Type
I errors in Regime C and Type II errors in Regime D. Thus, Regime D can be thought
of as more aggressive and Regime C more conservative relative to P’s preferred outcomes.
These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3: Assume Bj’s advice is decisive and bP =ˆ cC
j .T h e n ,
(i) There are neither Type I nor II errors in Regimes C and D if α =1and G  (ε)=0 .
(ii) There are only Type II errors in Regime D if α<1 regardless of the sign of G  (ε).
iii) There are only Type I errors in Regime C if G  (ε) > 0.
iv) There are Type II errors in both Regimes if α<1 and G  (ε) < 0.I fα is high enough,
Type II errors are greater in Regime C than in Regime D, and vice versa.
13 We assume that bP  ˆ cD/2 continues to apply when α is decreased. If not, P may choose
not to undertake any project regardless of the advice received.
26Of course, as P’s beneﬁt bP becomes smaller, there will be more Type II errors and less
Type I errors, but the above pattern of biases between the two Regimes will persist.
7 Conclusions
This paper has explored ways in which well-informed bureaucrats may be able to manip-
ulate the outcomes of public policy to suit themselves rather that the politicians to whom
they are directly accountable. The bureaucrat is limited by the possibility of facing disci-
pline if outcomes deviate excessively from those preferred by the politician. Depending on
the relative preferences of the politician and the bureaucrat, there may be a preponderance
of Type I or Type II errors in which the politician turns down projects that would have
been preferred under full information, and accepts projects that would not be undertaken
under perfect information. The basic model with a representative bureaucrat and a repre-
sentative politician deciding on a given project is suﬃcient to illustrate these points. These
results are purely positive in the sense that no presumption is made about whether the
preferences of the bureaucrat or the politician better represent that of society.
The basic model was extended to settings where projects are multi-dimensional and
advice may be decentralized to more than one bureaucrat. As long as relative preferences
are such that bureaucratic advice is decisive, both Type I and Type II errors can occur
in both centralized and decentyralized regimes. However, the relative chances of the two
types of errors occuring depends upon whether the distribution function determining if
bureaucrats are disciplined is strictly concave or strictly convex. If G(ε) is strictly convex,
the decentralized regime temds to be more expansionary than the centralized regime, and
vice versa if G(ε) is strictly concave. There appears to be no a priori reason to assume
one or the other case. Which regime the politician may prefer given the form of G(ε) will
depend upon the relative weights put on Type I and Type II errors.
The analysis and its interpretation could be extended in a number of directions. In
our model, the cost of the project becomes known to the politician ex post if the project
is undertaken. It would be straightforward to assume that the politician only observes an
imperfect signal of the cost. Then, the probability of discipline could readily take that
into account. If we were to allow to politician to observe costs ex post no matter what,
27the bureaucrat could also be disciplined if the project did not go ahead. One could also
allow the bureaucrat to have an unobservable level of ability or competence, which aﬀects
the value of the outcome of the project. In a career concern version of the model, the
bureaucrat could be disciplined if his ability is found to be below a certain level, rather
than because the project recommended does not conform with the politician’s preferences.
In our analysis, we have assumed that the bureaucrat is fully informed about the politician’s
preferences. It would be possible to take an asymmetric information approach with respect
to that. In all these cases, the methodological approach we have taken could be readily
adopted to deal with the complications involved.
Alternative informational assumptions could also be considered. The politician could
be allowed to hire external advisors to supplement the advice given by the bureaucrat.
This turns out to be beneﬁcial to the politician as long as the advisors preferences are
suﬃciently close to those of the politician. Alternatively, the bureaucrat might not be
perfectly informed, and may be able to improve his information at some cost.
Finally, other dimensions of decision-making could be studied. For example, projects
may have more than one cost dimension that may be evaluated diﬀerently by politicians
and bureaucrats. Thus, costs might include both direct costs and indirect costs, like
environmental degradation.
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Given this choice of projects, which B will anticipate perfectly, B has no incentive to
deviate from strategy mI given by (13). Therefore, it will be an equilibrium.





























B > 0), B will want to send m =( 1 ,1) in order to get P to choose x = 2. Sending
mI =( 1 ,0) will induce P to choose x = 0, which B values less than x = 2. Therefore, mI






























2 )/2, P’s choice x(mII) will be identical to x(mI) given above. In
this case, B will have an incentive to deviate if c ∈ [cC
12,c C
2 ]. Since v1
B >v 2
B in this range,
B would prefer to send m =( 1 ,0) to obtain x = 1 rather than mII =( 1 ,1). Thus, mII is
not sustainable in this range.
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Figure 4(b). Centralized Regime with Two Projects: G  (ε) > 0
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